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Abstract
The availability and easy access to digital communication increase the risk of
copyrighted material piracy. In order to detect illegal use or distribution of data,
digital watermarking has been proposed as a suitable tool. It protects the copy-
right of digital content by embedding imperceptible information into the data in
the presence of an adversary. The goal of the adversary is to remove the copy-
righted content of the data. Therefore, an efficient watermarking framework must
be robust to multiple image-processing operations known as attacks that can alter
embedded copyright information. Another line of research adversarial machine
learning also tackles with similar problems to guarantee robustness to impercepti-
ble perturbations of the input. In this work, we propose to apply robust optimiza-
tion from adversarial machine learning to improve the robustness of a CNN-based
watermarking framework. Our experimental results on the COCO dataset show
that the robustness of a watermarking framework can be improved by utilizing
robust optimization in training.
1 Introduction
Digital watermarking as a tool for preventing copyright violation of data has been an active research
field for decades [Cox et al., 2007]. Typically, a pattern of bits is embedded into a host image
with no visible degradation to the original image. An ideal watermarking system should guarantee
that the embedded watermarks are imperceptible and unremovable by malicious attacks. Therefore,
robust watermarking systems in the presence of adversary have been developed to declare rightful
ownership. In watermarking, image processing operations such as image enhancement, cropping,
resizing, or compression can be regarded as attacks. As a result, the performance of watermarking
systems is commonly measured by their robustness to these attacks.
Similar to the watermarking, the field of adversarial machine learning also seeks to improve the
robustness of neural networks in an adversarial environment [Kurakin et al., 2016]. Adversarial
examples can be defined as specifically crafted inputs by an attacker to cause the neural network
models to misbehave. This phenomenon was first observed by Szegedy et al. [2013]. To mitigate this
problem, the notion of adversarial training has been proposed. The basic idea is injecting adversarial
examples into the training set at every step of training neural networks [Goodfellow et al., 2014].
Adversarial learning aims to minimize the adversarial risk as opposed to the traditional risk. Adver-
sarial risk is the expected worst-case loss of each sample in some region around the sample point
instead of the loss on each sample point. Hence, adversarial training can be formulated as the min-
max or robust optimization problem where the task of inner maximization perturbs inputs within
a region so that the loss is maximized and the outer minimization optimizes the parameters of the
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neural network so that the worst-case loss is minimized. This provides a more accurate estimate of
the performance of the neural network operating in an adversarial environment.
Most recently, Quiring et al. [2018] attempted to bring digital watermarking and adversarial machine
learning together due to the similarities in defense and attack strategies in both fields. They provided
a unified notation for black-box attacks in both fields to enable transferring concepts. In this work,
we formulate a robust watermarking framework ROMark by employing the concepts from the robust
optimization. Watermarking schemes typically contain two components: an encoder and a decoder.
The encoder takes an image as well as a watermark message and produces a watermarked image.
The decoder recovers the watermark from the watermarked image. Assuming both encoder and
decoder are neural networks, an adversarial attack can be simulated at the output of the encoder. In
our work, we apply a set of attacks at the output of the encoder and feed the worst-case attacked
image to the decoder. We then optimize the parameters of both encoder and decoder.
Related Work: Using deep networks in watermarking frameworks has become popular most re-
cently [Zhu et al., 2018, Mun et al., 2017, Ahmadi et al., 2018]. Among these, CNN-based HiDDeN
[Zhu et al., 2018] is the most relevant work to ours as it also uses adversarial training. HiDDeN
achives robustness in two ways: (i) by inserting a noise layer between the output of the encoder
and the input of the decoder, and (ii) by adding an adversarial loss to the objective loss. However,
HiDDeN does not solve the min-max optimization directly.
Our Contributions: We adopt the architecture of the HiDDeN but compute the worst-case attacked
image in the noise layer whereas HiDDeN’s noise layer outputs attacked (adversarial) image by
using a fixed set of parameters for the attacks. Our experiments on the COCO dataset demonstrate
that our min-max formulation in training watermarking framework improves robustness to different
types of image transformations.
2 Proposed approach: ROMark
Robust optimization aims to obtain solutions against the worst-case realizations of the data from
a known uncertainty set. In the case of designing a robust watermarking system in an adversarial
environment, the robust optimization formulation can be defined as solving two sub-problems: (i)
obtaining the worst-case watermarked images that induce the largest decoding error within limits;
(ii) optimizing parameters of the watermarking model on the worst-case watermarked images so that
the loss of worst-case is minimized.
More formally, let Eθ parameterized by θ and Dφ parameterized by φ denote the encoder and the
decoder of the watermarking framework, respectively. The encoder outputs the watermarked image
xwm by embedding a binary secret message m into a cover image x so that xwm = Eθ(x,m). The
watermarked images should perceptually look similar to the cover images. Therefore, the similarity
distance between these can be characterized by the loss function LE(x, xwm) which typically mea-
sures the `2 distance. The decoder reconstructs message mˆ that has the same shape as m contained
in the watermarked image xwm: mˆ = Dφ(xwm). The similarity between m and mˆ indicates the
success of the decoding process. We define a loss function LD to measure the difference between
the embedded message and the reconstructed message from the decoder. Hence the empirical ob-
jective function of our robust watermarking framework can be formulated as the min-max problem
as follows:
min
θ,φ
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
xatti ∈Ui
LD
(
mi, Dφ
(
xatti
))
+ LE (Eθ (xi,mi) , xi) (1)
where Ui is the uncertainty set corresponding to the i-th image and xatti is the corresponding simu-
lated attacked image (or the adversarial example).
2.1 Inner maximization: Obtaining Worst-case Attacked Images
Solving outer minimization in equation 1 requires access to the worst-case attacked images xatti .
This maximization problem can be solved by finding the attacked image xatti within a constraint
set around xwmi which maximizes the probability that the decoder fails to recover the watermarks.
In digital watermarking, adversarial attacks are typically caused by image distortions such as crop,
image compression and blurring. Therefore, we define the images distorted by these attacks with
varying severity levels as our uncertainty set. Let’s assume there are K image distortion functions
Ni where i ∈ {1, · · · ,K} with corresponding severity level sets Si. The worst-case attacked image
can be defined as:
xatt∗ = N∗(xwm, s∗) (2)
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where s∗ and N∗ are obtained by:
s∗, N∗ = argmax
N∈{N1,··· ,NK},s∈{S1,··· ,SK}
LD (m,Dφ (N(x
wm, s)) (3)
2.2 Outer minimization: Optimizing the Model Parameters
The goal of the outer minimization problem is to optimize the model parameters that minimizes the
worst-case decoding loss. Reducing the worst-case loss offers a robustness guarantee that none of
the considered attacks would induce a loss of large magnitute, i.e., successfully removes watermarks.
Generally, after obtaining the worst-case attacked images, the outer minimization problem can be
then represented as:
min
θ,φ
1
n
n∑
i=1
LD (mi, Dφ (N
∗(Eθ (xi,mi) , s∗))) + LE (Eθ (xi,mi) , xi) (4)
Note that, N∗ in equation 4 should be differentiable to enable gradient derived from LD to backpro-
pogate to encoder Eθ.
2.3 Overall Training
In this section, we present the details of overall training. We use the mean squared error (MSE) for
the loss at the decoder: LD(mi, mˆi) = ‖mi − mˆi‖2. The loss for the encoder LE comprises the
MSE loss between the watermarked and the cover image: LEI(xi, xwmi ) = ‖xi − xwmi ‖2 and an
adversarial loss for the watermarked image: LEA(xwmi ) = log(1−Cβ(xwmi )). Cβ is a discriminator
network that is parameterized by β, which is trained by minimizing the loss A(xi, xwmi ) = log(1−
Cβ(xi)) + log(Cβ(x
wm
i )). Hence, for a set of training samples X and the secret messages M , the
outer minimization problem can be re-written as:
min
θ,φ
[
Jθ,φ(X,M) =
n∑
i=0
LD(mi, Dφ(x
att∗
i )) + λILEI(xi, Eθ(xi,mi)) + λALEA(Eθ(xi,mi))
]
(5)
where λA and λI control the relative weights of losses and xatt∗i is obtained by equation 2. Our
Algorithm for training ROMark using combination of all attacks is given in Algorithm 1. Note that,
due to computational issues we are only optimizing s for each Ni instead of optimizing both s and
Ni. We are investigating the latter as future work.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial training of ROMark Combined
Require: Batch size: b, Learning Rate: γβ ,γθ,γφ, Attack functions: N1, ..., NK
Randomly initialize the networks: Dφ, Eθ and Cβ .
Randomly sample message batch M of batch size b.
Select K integers: k1, ..., ki, ..., kK , whereK is the number of types of attacks and
∑K
i=1 ki = b
repeat
Read minibatch B = {x1, ..., xb} from training set.
Generate the watermarked minibatch Bwm = {Eθ(xi,mi) : xi ∈ B,mi ∈M}
Separate the minibatch Bwm into K subsets {B1wm, ..., BKwm} where each contains ki im-
ages
Load severity ranges of attacks: S1, ..., SK
for i = 1, 2,..., K do
Search the worst-case s∗i by: s
∗
i = argmaxs∈Si
∑
xwm∈Bi L(m,Dφ(Ni(x
wm, s)))
Calculate the worst-case attacked image batch Biatt = {Ni(xkwm, s∗i ) : xkwm ∈ Biwm}
end for
Generate attacked minibatch Batt = {B1att, ..., BKatt}
Feed Batt into decoder, and then do one step training step:
Updating discriminator C:
βt+1 = βt − γβ
∑
xi∈B,xwmi ∈Bwm ∇βA(xi, x
wm
i )
Updating Dφ and Eθ:
θt+1 = θt − γθ∇θJ(B,M) and φt+1 = φt − γφ∇φJ(B,M)
until Training losses converged
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Model Attack Type Identity (no attack) Crop Cropout Dropout Gaussian Blur JPEG Compression Combined
ROMark Range - (0.1, 0.8) (0.3, 0.9) (0.3, 0.9) (1, 5) (50, 100) Combination of all
Step Size - 0.1 0.1 0.1 1 10 -
HiDDeN Intensity - 0.3 0.3 0.3 2 - Combination of all
Table 1: Parameter settings of noise layers used in training HiDDeN and ROMark models.
3 Implementation Details
We apply our ROMark and HiDDeN to the COCO dataset [Lin et al., 2014] (10, 000 for training and
1000 for testing) and evaluate the robustness to image processing attacks. We use peak signal-to-
noise ratio (PSNR) and the bit accuracy to measure the performance. PSNR measures the amount of
distortion in the encoded images so that high value of PSNR indicates better quality of the images.
Bit accuracy is the ratio of correctly recovered bits to the total number of bits in the decoded water-
marks. The embedded watermarks are randomly sampled binary vectors with length of 30. We use
crop, cropout, dropout, Gaussian Blur and JPEG compression with various severity levels as attacks.
Both ROMark and HiDDeN are trained with these specialized attacks and also combination of all.
For a fair comparison, we use the same network architecture and hyperparameters for both ROMark
and HiDDeN. The parameters of the attacks used in training are shown in Table 1.
4 Experimental Results
In Figure 1, we show the bit accuracy rates for both models under different attacks with different
severity levels. When trained with the combination of all attacks, our ROMark Combined is more
robust than HiDDeN Combined to all attacks at all severity levels. Using only the specialized attacks
in training, our ROMark Specialized is more robust than the HiDDeN specialized for all attacks.
Furthermore, HiDDeN Specialized yields higher accuracy under the attacks which were also used
in training, i.e. overfits. Our ROMark, on the other hand, does not have the overfitting problem.
Figure 1: Bit accuracy of ROMark models and HiDDeN models for various attacks and intensities.
X-axis represents severity levels which increases from left to right.
Model Type Crop Cropout Dropout Gaussian Blur JPEG Combined
HiDDeN 24.32 24.20 24.20 24.81 23.57 24.56
ROMark 26.78 23.98 26.58 23.67 27.70 27.80
Table 2: Average watermarking PSNR over 1000 testing images.
5 Conclusion
We proposed a novel way to train a watermarking framework using the min-max formulation from
robust optimization. The idea of minimizing the worst-case loss across several attacks makes the
watermarking framework more robust to malicious attacks. Our experiments on the COCO dataset
demonstrate that our min-max formulation in training watermarking framework improves robustness
to different types of watermarking attacks.
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